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RECENT CASE NOTES
NEW FEATURES OF LAW JOURNAL
There appear in this issue two new features of the Law Journal
which it is thought may prove of interest to the members of the Asso-
ciation, namely, a list of the Presidents of the Bar Associations of
Indiana and a list of Judges and other court officers in Indiana. The
information from which these lists were compiled was furnished
largely by the clerks of the circuit courts of the various counties of the
State. Certain lawyers of the State supplemented this information
from the clerks. We desire to express our appreciation to these clerks
and lawyers for their cooperation in furnishing this information. The
information is believed to be complete and accurate. If, however,
any errors have been made, we shall appreciate information which
will enable us to correct such error.
Editor.
RECENT CASE NOTES
REPEAL OF THE TEACHERS' ACT AS IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CON-
TRAcT.-By this action it is sought to mandate appellee, a township trustee,
to continue relatrix in the employ of the township as a school teacher.
Relatrix had become a permanent teacher under the Teachers' Tenure Act
of 1927, which provides that a person who has served under contract as a
teacher in any school corporation for five or more successive years, and shall
thereafter enter into a contract for further service, shall become a permanent
teacher of such school corporation. The act was amended in 1933 and made
to apply to city and town school corporations only. Thus, the former act
was repealed in so far as township schools are concerned. Held, there is no
vested right in a permanent teacher's contract; therefore, the repeal of the
Teachers' Tenure Act, in so far as it affects townships and township schools,
removes the so-called tenure rights of teachers acquired prior to its repeal.1
This case presents an interesting problem as to whether or not a permanent
tenure teacher has a contract right which the Federal 2 and the State3 Con-
stitutions protect from impairment by subsequent legislation. Naturally, the
first question that arises is this: Does the teacher have a valid contract with
the State? The law seems to be pretty well settled that the relation between
the State and a teacher in the public schools is that of employer and employee,
created by contract.4 It is not a public office 5 and therefore is not subject
I State, ex rel. Anderson v. Brand (Ind. 1937), 5 N. E. (2d) 531, dissenting
opinion by Judge Treanor, 5 N. E. (2d) 913.
2 Constitution of the United States, Art. 1, Sec. 10, "No State shall
pass any . . law impairing the obligation of contracts "
3Constitution of Indiana, Art. 1, Sec. 24, "No ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed."
4Willis, Constitutional Law, pp. 604, 635, 56 C. J. 382, sec. 303, Elwood
v. State, ex rel. Griffin (1932), 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471; Kostanzer v. State,
ex rel. Ramsey (1933), 205 Ind. 536, 546, 187 N. E. 337; Arburn v. Hunt
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to be terminated by the Legislature at any time. The relation remains con-
tractual after the person has become a permanent teacher under the provisions
of a tenure law;6 but the terms and conditions of the contract are thereafter
governed primarily by the statute.7 The court in the instant case seems to
believe that, because the statute makes the contract "indefinite," no binding,
enforceable agreement is made, but that the tenure teacher is merely given
preferential rights over other teachers. The answer to this seems to be that
definite duration is not an essential element of a contract and that a provision
for modification of the manner and time of performance does not make it
unenforceable. Tenure contracts are no more indefinite now than they were
before the repealing act was passed, and the cases prior thereto are unanimous
in holding that such contracts were binding until terminated by a method set
out in the Act.8
The next question involved is whether the fact that this contract was
made with the State, rather than another individual, makes it less effective.
On this score the law is settled that the obligation of contracts clause protects
public or state contracts as well as those between private individuals.9 How-
ever, a state cannot contract away its police power.'O While one might
maintain that the abrogation of tenure contracts is a proper exercise of the
State's police power, such a contention seems untenable here, because both
the Legislature, by retaining the policy of the Teachers' Tenure Act as to
city and town school corporations, and the Court, by its recent decisions
(1934), 207 Ind. 61, 191 N. E. 148, Martin v. Fisher (1930), 108 Cal. App. 34,
291 P 276, State, ex rel. O'Neil v. Blied (1925), 188 Wis. 442. 206 N. W.
213, State, ex rel. Nyberg v. Milwaukee Board (1926), 190 Wis. 570, 209 N. W.
683, Mootz v. Belyea (1931), 60 N. D. 741, 236 N. W 358.
5 56 C. J. 382, sec. 303, Kostanzer v. State, ex rel. Ramsey (1933), 205 Ind.
536, 546, 187 N. E. 337, Elwood v. State, ex rel. Griffin (1932), 203 Ind. 626,
180 N. E. 471.
6 The Teachers' Tenure Act (Acts 1927, c. 97, p. 259) expressly provides for
a contract, which shall be known as an indefinite contract, remaining in force
until succeeded by a new contract or properly cancelled. State, ex rel. Black
v. Board of School Commissioners (1933), 205 Ind. 582, 187 N. E. 392; Arburn
v. Hunt (1934), 207 Ind. 61, 191 N. E. 148, Martin v. Fisher (1930), 108 Cal,
App. 34, 291 P 276. Brumfield v. State, ex rel. Wallace (1934), 205 Ind.
647, 190 N. E. 863, uses language to the effect that the contractual relations
"are merely evidentiary in character affecting relatrix' status relative to the
school corporation." But it is submitted that there can be a contractual
relation even though there is a status; and this case doesn't seem to deny
such a proposition.
7 Elwood v. State, ex rel. Griffin (1932), 203 Ind. 626, 634, 180 N. E. 471.
8Kostanzer v. State, ex rel. Ramsey (1933), 205 Ind. 536, 187 N. E. 337;
State, ex rel. Black v. Board of School Commissioners (1933), 205 Ind. 582,
187 N. E. 392; Elwood v. State, ex rel. Griffin (1932), 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E.
471.
9 12 C. J. 996, sec. 608, Hall v. Wisconsin (1880), 103 U. S. 5, 26 L. Ed.
302; Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162; Providence Bank
v. Billings (1830), 4 Pet. 514, 7 L. Ed. 939; Carr v. State, ex rel. Coetlosquet
(1890), 127 Ind. 204, 26 N. E. 778, 11 L. R. A. 370.
10 Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 618; 12 C. 3. 912, sec. 423, Stone v.
Mississippi (1879), 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079; Butchers etc. Co. v. Crescent
City etc. Co. (1884), 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. Ed. 585, Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v.
Connersville (1907), 170 Ind. 316, 83 N. E. 503, Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v.
Harrington (1891), 131 Ind. 426, 30 N. E. 37
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upholding the policy of the Act,11 have indicated that there is a social interest
in favor of permanent teachers' contracts. One can hardly say that permanent
tenure is desirable for city and town schools because it prevents the removal of
capable and experienced teachers at the political or personal whim of changing
officeholders, and at the same time maintain that it is so undesirable for
township schools that the Legislature was justified in abrogating all permanent
contracts of teachers in such schools.
The court seems to place a great deal of weight on the proposition that
the contract cannot exist without the license and that, since the Legislature
could have revoked the license, it could do the lesser thing and revoke the
tenure contracts. If this reasoning be good, the Legislature could revoke all
contracts of non-tenure teachers without revoking their licenses-a surprising
idea, to say the least. While it may be true that the Legislature has the
power to revoke a license, 1 2 there is no authority to the effect that it can
abrogate contracts at its pleasure.1 3 Even though the license could have been
revoked, the fact remains that it was not and that the teacher is still capable
of performing her part of the agreement. Therefore, one has difficulty in
contending that there was not a valid contract here.
The cases of other states factually similar to the principal case appear to
be contra to it. In a case almost identical with this one, the California Court
held that permanent tenure, automatically attained before repeal of the statute
providing therefor, was not lost by virtue of failure on the part of the Legis-
lature to adopt a saving clause as a part of the repealing act.1 4 The decision
was based on the ground that the teacher had a vested right to such tenure.
That Court did not say the vested right was acquired from the contract, made
permanent by the statute; but another California case holds that the statute
merely extended the term of the contract and did not change the contractual
relation of employer and employee. 15 Wisconsm 1 6 and New Jersey17 have
held that a teacher who has accepted and complied with a statute providing
for a teachers' retirement fund stands in a contractual relation with the
State and his contract cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation. Another
case holds that the status or contract right of one permanently employed as
a teacher under a permanent tenure system and with rights so fixed cannot
11State, ex rel. Clark v. Stout, Trustee (1933), 206 Ind. 58, 64, 187 N. E.
267; Whitlatch v. School Township of Milan (Ind. 1935), 198 N. E. 85, 87.
1212 C. J. 997, see. 610; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1876), 94 U. S.
535, 540, 24 L. Ed. 143; Stone, Supt., v. Fritts (1907), 169 Ind. 361, 364, 365,
82 N. E. 792, 794.
13 The language quoted by the Court indicates this distinction. The Court
quotes from Stone, Supt., v. Fritts (1907), 169 Ind. 361, 365, 82 N. E. 792,
794, this statement: "A license has none of the elements of a contract, and
does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised
under existing restrictions and such as thereafter may be reasonably imposed."
14 Gastineau v. Meyer (1933), 131 Cal. App. 611, 22 P (2d) 31. See also
Chambers v. Davis (1933), 131 Cal. App. 500, 22 P (2d) 27 and Klein v.
Board of Education (1934), 1 Cal. (2d) 706, 37 P (2d) 74.
1 Martin v. Fisher (1930), 108 Cal. App. 34, 291 P 276.
16 State, ex rel. O'Neil v. Blied (1925), 188 Wis. 442, 206 N. W 213.
17 Ball v. Board of Trustees of Teachers' Retirement Fund (1904), 71
N. J. 64, 58 A. 111.
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be impaired by subsequent legislation.18 The United States Supreme Court
has held that a contract between a State and a party, whereby he is to perform
certain duties for a specific period19 at a stipulated compensation, is within
the protection of the Constitution and that it is not affected by the repeal
of the statute pursuant to which it was made.2 0 On the other hand, there is
little or no authority favoring the proposition that a state can invalidate its
teachers' contracts by subsequent legislation.
On the whole, the holding of this case seems to be a departure from
practically all the authorities. It seems to go as far as to hold that the
Legislature is free to annul any contract entered into by the State under the
authorization of a prior legislative enactment. In other words, it puts such
a contract on a parity with a mere license in so far as revocation is concerned.
On the other hand, the well-reasoned dissenting opinion of Judge Treanor 2 l
is supported by both logic and authorities and the constitutional problems
which he points out might be made the basis of an appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States. W. I. M.
WILLs-REvocATIoN.-Testator wrote "void" on the margin of his will and
across the envelope containing it, and drew intersecting diagonal lines across
the writing of the will. These lines started just below the title and extended
through the body of the will, through testator's signature, through the attesta-
tion clause, and stopped just above the signatures of the witnesses. It was
conceded that the testator intended thereby to revoke the will. The only
question in the case was whether or not testator's acts were sufficient, under
the Indiana statute, to effect a revocation. Held, the will had not been
revoked.1
The English Statute of Frauds provided that a will could be revoked only
by burning, canceling, tearing, or obliterating, or by another writing.2 This
statute served as a model for the statutes in most of our states, in that those
statutes generally specify several methods of revocation. 3 Neither the Statute
of Frauds nor the statutes of any of the states attempted to define the specific
acts that a testator must perform in order to revoke his will by one of the
methods prescribed. Consequently, in the development of the law on the
subject there was much litigation, and a proportionate amount of confusion
of thought in the early cases. The Statute of Victoria, which repealed parts
18 State, ex rel. Nyberg v. Milwaukee Board (1926), 190 Wis. 570, 209
N. W 683.
19There seems to be no valid objection to the tenure contracts on the
ground that they are for an indefinite duration, because the contracts were
to continue in force until terminated by a method provided in the statute.
The Court did not have any trouble in granting the teacher the remedy of
mandamus before the Act of 1933. See State, ex rel. Black v. Board of School
Commissioners (1933), 205 Ind. 582, 187 N. E. 392; Kostanzer v. State, ex rel.
Ramsey (1933), 205 Ind. 536, 187 N. E. 337; Elwood v. State, ex rel. Griffin
(1932), 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471.
20 Hall v. Wisconsin (1880), 103 U. S. 5, 26 L. Ed. 302. See, also,
Carondelet Canal & Nay. Co. v. Louisiana (1913), 233 U. S. 362, 34 S. Ct. 627.
21 State, ex rel. Anderson v. Brand (Ind. 1937), 5 N. E. (2d) 913. See,
also, Opinions of the Attorney General of Indiana (1933), pp. 100, 139.
1 Tinsley v. Carwile (Ind. App., 1937), 5 N. E. (2d) 982.
2 29 Car. II, Ch. 3.
3 14 Iowa L. R. 283.
